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In the last 20 years, the drive for evidence-based policymak-
ing has been coupled with a concurrent push for the use of 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs) as the “gold-standard” 
for generating rigorous evidence on whether or not devel-
opment interventions work. Drawing on content analysis of 
63 development RCTs and 4 years of participant observa-
tion, I provide a rich description of the diverse set of ac-
tors and the transnational organizational effort required to 
implement development RCTs and maintain their “scientific 
status.” Particularly, I investigate the boundary work that 
proponents of RCTs—also known as randomistas—do to dif-
ferentiate the purposes and merits of testing development 
projects from doing them, as a way to bypass the political 
and ethical problems presented by adopting the experimen-
tal method with foreign aid beneficiaries in poor countries. 
Although randomistas have been mostly successful in differ-
entiating RCTs from the projects evaluated, I also examine 
cases where they were not able to do so, as a means to high-
light the controversies associated with implementing RCTs 
in international development.
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1  | INTRODUC TION
In the last 20 years, the drive for evidence-based policymaking has been coupled with a concurrent push for the 
use of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) as the “gold-standard” for generating rigorous evidence for whether 
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or not development interventions work. Initially restricted to a handful of researchers located in Poverty Labs 
within economics departments in the US, RCTs are now being used to test almost everything from strategies 
to reduce electoral corruption in Sierra Leone to microcredit programs in Peru (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011). In the 
development community, if researchers, governmental officials, and donors want to know “what really works”, it 
is widely accepted that RCTs must be implemented to avoid a naïve or biased answer (Deaton, 2010; Harrison, 
2011). Furthermore, the growing institutionalization of the method is evidenced by wide coverage in the press 
and the conferment of several of the most prestigious awards for contributions to economics on Esther Duflo, a 
leading development economist and RCT advocate (Ogden, 2016).
Development RCTs institute experiments in everyday life to measure the impact of different poverty-allevi-
ation policies by comparing the results of treatment and control groups. A 1997 primary school deworming RCT 
is representative of this type of experimentation (Miguel & Kremer, 2004). In this RCT, the goal was to estimate 
the effect of intestinal diseases on educational outcomes for young children. Researchers selected 50 schools in 
rural Kenya to receive deworming medicine for free, and 25 schools were selected as controls that initially did not 
participate in the program. Researchers compared educational outcomes in the control and treatment groups and 
found considerable improvements in test scores and school attendance not only for students in treatment schools, 
but also spillover effects for kids that did not receive treatment. This finding led to a policy recommendation of 
distributing school-based deworming pills throughout the developing world, and similar programs had reached 
over 285 million children by 2017 (JPAL, 2017). Experiments like this are now implemented in distinct policy areas 
trying to answer a variety of development questions. In common, they use the comparison between control and 
treatment groups to test the effectiveness of development projects in countries from the Global South.
How are US-based researchers able to implement field experiments in developing countries and to persuade 
others about their “scientific status”? Similar to other forms of field experimentation, the implementation of devel-
opment RCTs requires ongoing negotiations between the need to control the “messiness” of the field for scientific 
purposes, while guaranteeing the cooperation, access, and buy-in of local populations so that the experiment 
can happen (Henke, 2000; Kohler & Vetter, 2016). As field-sites, however, developing countries present partic-
ular challenges for the successful balance between control and cooperation. These are places where any type 
of foreign intervention is inevitably entangled in the controversial politics of the foreign aid industry (Escobar, 
2012; Ferguson, 1990), making the distinction between development practice and research particularly blurry 
(Rayzberg, 2019a). How do development economists bypass the ethical and political controversies associated 
with foreign aid and convince others that developing countries can serve as appropriate sites to test economic 
theories?
To answer these questions, I adopt concepts from science and technology studies to describe the network 
that needs to be in place to implement development RCTs and to make them scientifically and politically plausible, 
reproducible, and disseminated (Eyal, 2013). Particularly, I highlight the multiple actors involved in implementing 
these experiments and the complex chains of transcriptions required to generate data from the messy reality of 
the field and turn it into something useful for both academics and policy officials (Latour, 1999). I demonstrate that 
proponents of development RCTs, or randomistas as they became known (Deaton, 2010), build on the ambiguity of 
what is being tested—is it an economic theory, a development project, or both?—to navigate the political, practical, 
and ethical problems associated with development aid and with randomly assigning social policy beneficiaries to 
treatment and controls groups. In doing so, I also argue that the scientific success of development RCTs is contin-
gent on their ability to construct the image of “the field” as a place that is free of politics and bureaucratic inter-
ference. For the most part, randomistas have been successful in creating a boundary between the purposes and 
merits of testing development projects and doing them. However, I also examine cases where they were not suc-
cessful in order to highlight the controversies associated with implementing RCTs in international development.
In recent years, a number of social scientists have started to problematize development RCTs, mostly by high-
lighting the strategies that randomistas adopt to transform contested development questions into seemingly tech-
nical problems (e.g., Berndt, 2015; Deaton & Cartwright, 2016; Rayzberg, 2019a). This paper contributes to this 
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scholarly conversation about development RCTs in two key ways. First, by combining content analysis of 63 RCTs 
and ethnographic data collected during 4 years of fieldwork, it provides a systematic empirical account of how 
these experiments operate on the ground. This account highlights the diversity of actors involved in RCTs, while 
so far attention has been given exclusively to the randomistas themselves (exceptions are Kabeer, 2019; Rayzberg, 
2019b). Second, this paper unveils the processes through which development RCTs can lose their scientific sta-
tus, helping to elucidate the problematic nature of RCTs from the viewpoint of the actors most affected by these 
experiments. In doing so, it contributes to a broader understanding of the politics of testing in international devel-
opment and the inequalities inherent to the diffusion of global evaluation standards.
The article is organized as follows. The first section explains what development RCTs are and illustrates how 
they differ from previous experiments done in economics. Second, I present my methods and data. Relying on 
ethnographic data, in the third section, I describe the organizational network that needs to be in place to make 
development RCTs work and how actors involved in this network deal with controversies associated with RCTs to 
make them credible to academic and policy audiences. Fourth, I explain the strategies that randomistas adopt to 
bypass the problematic nature of using the experimental method in developing countries, and I address the main 
ways that development RCTs are contested. Finally, I conclude by drawing implications from my case for a critical 
evaluation of testing.
2  | PRE VIOUS E XPERIMENTATION IN ECONOMIC S AND THE 
NOVELTIES OF DE VELOPMENT RC TS
Experimental trials in economics have a long tradition. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Negative Income Tax Trials 
used the experimental method to test the effectiveness of different social policies and had long-term effects 
on welfare debates in the United States (Rogers-Dillon, 2004). Likewise, during the 1980s and 1990s, economic 
research took the form of laboratory experiments, testing different hypotheses on behavioral economics that 
were highly influential for the conceptualization of electronic markets and behavioral theory (Guala, 2007). The 
development RCTs and Poverty Labs that are the object of this study, even if they build on the prestige of these 
previous experiments, differ from early economics experiments in two ways.
First, in contrast to most behavioral economics research that takes the form of laboratory experiments (in 
which volunteers enter a research lab to make decisions in a controlled environment), development RCTs function 
as field experiments: they are not only performed in the field, but also the division between control and treatment 
groups is done with real people, schools, and communities living their everyday lives. As randomistas themselves 
point out: “There may be more to learn about human behavior from the choices made by Kenyan farmers con-
fronted with a real choice than from those made by American undergraduates in laboratory conditions” (Duflo, 
2003, p. 8). This means that development RCTs, at least in their design, do not have to deal with criticism about 
“mock settings” or “stage action”: the experiments take place in situ (MacKenzie, Muniesa, & Siu, 2007). Instead, 
similar to other field sciences, they face a different type of credibility challenge, namely, the need to continuously 
demonstrate that experiments in developing countries could retain certain characteristics of lab sciences, such as 
generating generalizable, “placeless knowledge and being inconsequential” (Guggenheim, 2012, p. 102; Kohler & 
Vetter, 2016).
Second, while development RCTs and the social experiments that took place in the United States in the 1960s 
similarly happen in the field, they differ in scale, objectives, and geographical reach. In a recent publication from 
the main Poverty Lab (JPAL), researchers differentiate their experiments from the past ones on the following 
basis:
Unlike the early “social experiments” conducted in the United States…many of the RCTs that have been 
conducted in recent years in developing countries have had fairly small budgets, making them affordable 
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for development economists. Working with local partners on a smaller scale has also given more flexibil-
ity to researchers, who can often influence program design. As a result, RCTs have become a powerful 
research tool. (Duflo et al., 2007, p. 3)
“Researchers who can often influence program design.” This comment points to the key difference between de-
velopment RCTs in the 2000s and earlier “social experiments” in the United States: while the latter partnered with 
US government agencies, current RCTs are implemented together with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
foreign aid agencies in developing countries, allowing for much more flexibility to use the experimental method in 
field conditions than before (de Souza Leao & Eyal, 2019). Hence, while the 1960s’ social experiments could not assign 
participants randomly to a “no-treatment” control group and used the non-sampled population as their implicit control 
for comparisons (Riecken & Boruch, 1975), development RCTs seek to randomly assign beneficiaries to control groups, 
attempting to portray in this way an image of greater scientificity than previous experiments. Yet, since development 
RCTs are implemented in remote areas of developing countries, this also means that these experiments lack admin-
istrative data that is available in developed countries; they have to deal with language and cultural barriers, besides 
having to cope with greater levels of uncertainty and risk (Teele, 2014).
Furthermore, because development RCTs are implemented by mostly US-based researchers in developing 
countries, the distinctions between economic knowledge-making and development policy governance is partic-
ularly tricky to manage. As we will see in the third section, this is because development RCTs are more than 
simple hypothesis-testing instruments for economic theory, they are also used to redistribute social resources, 
to measure the impact of development projects, and to propose directions for future foreign aid interventions 
(Rottenburg et al., 2015). In this process, the line between what counts as experimentation and what counts as a 
development project is constantly in flux, posing similar ethical questions as processes used for recruiting human 
subjects for global clinical trials (Petryna, 2009; Rottenburg, 2009), related to whether development RCTs exploit 
or aim to help the global poor.
In sum, development RCTs combine aspects of both forms of previous experimentation in economics, but ap-
plied to a novel territory of intervention, that is, developing countries. On the one hand, development RCTs retain 
some characteristics of lab science, such as control groups and the aim to identify the causal effect of interven-
tions. On the other hand, they are decisively in the field, as they are conducted “in the messiness” of everyday life 
of developing countries, “where borders cannot be effectively policed” (Henke, 2000, p. 484). Building on Gieryn 
(2006, p. 32), therefore, similar to other field sciences, development RCTs gain legitimacy by “preserv[ing] and 
draw[ing] simultaneously—and in a complementary way—the assumed distinctive virtues of both lab and field.” 
How do randomistas manage to do so?
3  | METHODS AND DATA
To answer this question, I use two analytical strategies. First, I build on a dataset constructed as part of a larger 
project, in which I compiled a random sample of 63 RCTs done by the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab at 
MIT, or JPAL, led by the charismatic scholar-activist Esther Duflo. My analytical sample was defined on January 
13, 2016. Of the 625 RCTs that were listed in J-PAL’s library that day, I excluded 100 studies that were not con-
ducted in developing countries. From 525 RCTs, I randomly selected 100 RCTs to be analysed. I then excluded 
all RCTs that were still ongoing or for which I could not identify a corresponding publication, arriving at a final 
sample of 63 RCTs. For each RCT publication, I coded information regarding their study design, the authors, and 
relevant information about implementing and funding partners (see the Appendix for descriptive statistics of 
the sample).
Second, my account relies on 4 years of participant observation with randomistas. During this period, I par-
ticipated in two RCTs related to microfinance in Peru (2007), and one RCT in the field of financial education in 
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Brazil (2010–2012). For the purposes of this paper, I complemented this ethnographic data with an analysis of the 
controversy regarding development RCTs that appears in academic and policy debates. The publications analysed 
include academic articles, blog posts, and public interviews given by randomistas and international policy actors. 
It is to the analysis of this data that I now turn.
4  | THE MAKING OF DE VELOPMENT RC TS:  AC TORS,  PROCESSES, 
AND CONTROVERSIES
In her TED Talk, Esther Duflo (2010) explained how randomistas would revolutionize the international develop-
ment field: 
It’s not the Middle Ages anymore, it’s the 21st century. And in the 20th century, RCTs have revolutionized 
medicine by allowing us to distinguish between drugs that work and drugs that don't work. You can do 
the same randomized controlled trial for social policy. You can put social innovation to the same rigorous, 
scientific tests that we use for drugs. 
As has been extensively documented, however, the “revolution” that RCTs brought to the medical field depended on 
a contentious process that required political and organizational efforts to convince the multiple actors involved of 
the possibilities of adopting the experimental method with human subjects (Carpenter, 2010). The same is true for 
development RCTs. Implementing the experimental method in field conditions to answer international development 
questions is a huge task that involves multiple actors and resources.
In this section, I build on both my RCT sample and on my ethnographic data to describe how economists 
implement field experiments in developing countries; how they enrol relevant actors into field experiments; and 
the chain of transcriptions required to generate data from poor individuals’ behavior in the field that will then be 
published in academic journals. The findings in this section unveil the type of stakeholder enrolment and organi-
zational efforts that enable randomistas to establish the idea that developing countries are appropriate field-sites 
for scientific analysis—that is, sites that are not contaminated by geopolitical interests or bureaucratic politics. 
Through this assessment, I also demonstrate how the boundary work done to differentiate development research 
and practice allows randomistas to productively dismiss failures in field experiments as ideological or bureaucratic 
problems.
4.1 | The RCT network: A diverse set of actors
While much attention has been paid to randomistas, who are the public faces of RCTs and arguably the most 
influential actors in the network (Ogden, 2016), implementing any given development RCT requires collabora-
tion among a number of actors: the research team, the fieldwork team, survey firms, policy beneficiaries, funding 
agencies, and implementing partners. Below, I briefly describe each of these in order to highlight the diverse set 
of actors involved in development RCTs, as well as the internal negotiations that happen among these actors to 
make these experiments possible.
1. Research Team: The implementation of an RCT starts with the Research Team, based in Poverty Labs 
within economic departments, such as JPAL at MIT. In my analytical sample, 93% of these researchers 
had received their PhDs in Economics, and 7% graduated in Political Science. Randomistas have academic 
and administrative roles: they formulate the research question, design the experiment, analyse the data, 
and publish the academic papers, but they also have a key role in convincing the policy community of 
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the relevance of their work, in building the reputation of their labs, and in negotiating with funding 
agencies.
2. Field Team: Although the Research Team formulates the experimental design, implementing an RCT requires that 
an extended group of professionals work directly in developing countries, close to the project location. These 
individuals have a different profile than randomistas. From the 123 local staff that appear in my sample, 45% 
had graduate degrees in Economics and Public Policy, but many instead had graduate degrees in Development 
Studies (20%) and even in the Humanities (12%). The Field Team has a diverse range of tasks—from explaining 
the experimental methodology to partners implementing the policy and asserting the quality of the experiment, 
to hiring survey firms and solving any unexpected problems in the field. As a randomista explained to me, they 
are considered “the voice and eyes of the researchers” in the project site, and play a key role in controlling the 
quality of the experiment. Below, I will show how these actors also have great discretionary power in the tran-
scription process involved in RCTs.
3. Implementing Partners: These are the organizations whose policies will be evaluated by the Research Team. 
Partner organizations can be divided into high-level decision-makers and their staff (which I treat as a separate 
actor). The vast majority of RCTs are conducted with NGOs: in my analytical sample, for example, 75% of im-
plementing partners are NGOs or for-profit organizations involved in microfinance projects together with local 
NGOs. In my ethnographic work, I observed that these NGOs are led by a highly educated group with extensive 
international experience, which came either from their relationship with foreign aid agencies or professional 
training. The role of these policy managers in RCT implementation is to establish the institutional partner-
ship with Poverty Labs, provide financial and infrastructural resources, and disseminate results together with 
randomistas.
4. NGO Staff: This group is responsible for the day-to-day work of development organizations. Staff members 
include teachers, nurses, and micro-credit agents, among others. While I did not have information about these 
actors in my RCT sample, during my fieldwork, I could examine the key features of their profile: they have either 
secondary education or a BA degree in a less prestigious field of study; they usually do not speak English, but 
they have a great deal of tacit knowledge regarding the policy being implemented. NGOs’ staff are the ones that 
have their daily activities most affected by the experiment: they modify their practices to respect the treatment 
and control group division, report back to the Field Team and the high-level staff about their activities, and make 
the connection between the survey firm and policy beneficiaries, while also being directed evaluated.
5. Policy Beneficiaries: These are the individuals, or the local population, who are affected by the policy being 
tested and will respond to the survey questionnaires. Randomistas refer to them as “The Poor” (a broad category 
that involves a multiplicity of groups) whose behavior they are trying to understand and shape. Results from 
field experiments depend on their willingness to answer survey questionnaires properly, but they have no in-
fluence over the design of the RCTs. Yet, all administrative data available of their behavior and socioeconomic 
background is closely monitored to assess the impact of development policies.
6. Survey Firms: In order to obtain data from development RCTs, a crucial part of the process is hiring and train-
ing either a local survey firm or independent surveyors. In my fieldwork, I noticed that surveyors had a uni-
versity degree and experience with survey implementation, but no international work experience or English 
proficiency. Surveyors are trained to implement the questionnaires with the policy beneficiaries, are taught the 
basics of the experimental method, and have their activities closely supervised by the Field Team.
7. Funding Agencies: Poverty Labs count on a diverse portfolio of agencies to fund their activities. In my sample, 
34% of funding came from multi-lateral institutions (e.g., World Bank and USAID), 40% from philanthropic foun-
dations (e.g., Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation), and the rest from a mix of local sources and country donors. 
Their role in implementation is to provide the financial and infra-structural resources, but Funding Agencies can 
also have an impact on the type of projects that will be evaluated. Individuals in these agencies have a similar 
profile to the policy-makers: elite academic training and vast international experience.
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4.2 | Chains of transcriptions: The process of implementing an RCT
The actors in the RCT network are situated in distinct geographical locations, and they influence field experiments 
with different weights and strategies. Perhaps the most powerful actors in the network are located in academic 
departments in the US or Europe, where the Research Team and Funding Agencies make decisions regarding 
the design and costs of RCTs and decide which NGOs to partner with at the local level. The immense infrastruc-
ture required to implement RCTs, however, is situated in remote areas of developing countries. Although NGOs, 
Surveyors, and Policy Beneficiaries have little influence on the design of the experiments, without their active 
cooperation, the RCT could not be implemented.
Contrary to the transcription of natural objects (Latour, 1999), transcribing the behavior of poor individ-
uals depends greatly on the ability of researchers to govern the web of social relations that exist in the field. 
To do so, the transcription process starts with an intense communication exchange between the Research and 
Field Teams to decide on the best experimental design possible to evaluate the NGO’s policy. Both teams use 
available administrative data to estimate the minimum size and design of the experiment that can simultane-
ously guarantee statistical power (hence securing the robustness of the results), while sounding politically 
feasible.
After a decision is reached about the experimental design at the Poverty Lab level, another round of analysis 
and negotiation happen between the Field Team, high-level officials, and staff from NGOs. This is when the pre-
ferred experimental design by the researchers gets a reality check from policy managers, in what can be a very 
contentious negotiation process. In my fieldwork in Brazil, for example, one teachers’ union threatened to strike 
against what they considered an overly ambitious RCT size. In response, the Research Team substantially reduced 
the experimental design to secure teachers’ buy-in and the continuity of the experiment. Similar to this case, it is 
common for the RCT strategy to be simplified based on constraints of funding, data, ethical and political concerns, 
infrastructure, and operations. For a development RCT to happen, policy and academic sides have to compromise 
and agree on a final experiment design.
With an experiment strategy in hand, the Field Team is then responsible for hiring a survey firm that will 
apply the questionnaires and do the data-entry of the surveys, as well as training the street-level bureaucracies 
implementing the policies to adapt their practices to fit the experiment design. At this stage, again, local bureau-
cracies often react against attempts to substantially change their daily practices in the name of the experiment, 
prompting the Field Team to continuously remind them about the importance of securing the quality of the RCT 
and the surveillance mechanisms they will use to ensure that the NGO staff does so. The training period is thus 
key to avoid that “NGOs boycott the RCT” and that they “appreciate the value of our experiment,” as pointed out 
by two Field Team members in Peru.
Following this training period, an initial questionnaire is implemented with all the beneficiaries from control 
and treatment groups before the new policies being tested are put into practice. It is during the implementation 
of this baseline survey that the journey of the RCT data from the field to publications starts. A first, non-trivial, 
step is finding the individuals that will be interviewed—the ones from the treatment group are relatively easier to 
find because surveyors can count on the NGOs’ administrative apparatus to schedule the interviews. Interviewing 
individuals in the control group, however, is harder because these individuals will not benefit from the policy, they 
commonly live in places without formal addresses, and they have to voluntarily agree to serve as research subjects 
(Rayzberg, 2019a).
After individuals from control and treatment groups are found, the actual paper survey can then be imple-
mented. Usually, understanding how “The Poor” behaves means asking individuals to wait in line to be interviewed 
and to answer a 10- to 50-page-long questionnaire. Interviews last from 30 min to 2 hr. They are done in the local 
language of the village where the experiment will take place, and the interview schedule consists mostly of behav-
ioral questions, which are frequently hypothetical questions, such as the examples below:
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Determining financial literacy Determining aversion to risk
Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 
1% per year and inflation was 2% per year. After 1 year, 
would you be able to buy more than, exactly the same as, 
or less than today with the money in this account?
Suppose you had to choose between the following two 
options: 
A. You receive 30 dollars with certainty.
B. A coin toss: if the outcome is heads, you receive 100 
dollars; if it is tails, you receive nothing. Do you understand 
the two options? [Check for understanding]. Which would 
you prefer?
a) More than today; a) 30 dollars with certainty;
b) Exactly the same as today; b) 100/0 dollars coin toss;
c) Less than today. c) Don’t know.
Through answers to one or two questions like the examples above, researchers will then create an index 
measuring, for example, “Financial Literacy Levels” of respondents, as well as “Aversion to Risk” indexes. Besides 
hypothetical behavioral questions, questionnaires have socioeconomic and policy implementation questions to 
guarantee that the control and treatment group divisions were respected.
After the baseline survey is finished, the development intervention begins. The time distance between this 
first survey and the final survey, when the results of the policies will be assessed, varies, ranging from 3 months to 
up to 2 years. During this period, NGO staff are expected to respect the division between control and treatment 
groups, and the fieldwork team is constantly monitoring if they do so. The forms of surveillance of the quality of 
the experiment are multiple and key to the success of the RCTs: they range from surprise visits to different project 
sites and monitoring of administrative data of the NGO, to meetings with beneficiaries and policy officials, and a 
great deal of face-to-face conversations to remind street-level staff of the importance of respecting the design 
of RCTs.
Finally, after the policy being tested ends, a second survey is administered with the same questionnaire, and 
the data-entry of all the paper surveys begins. This data is intensely “cleaned” by the Field Team, then sent to uni-
versities where the analysis and eventual publications will be carried out. At the end of this data-cleaning process, 
randomistas receive a database file containing the behavior of “The Poor.” Even at this point, when the data has 
already been completely decontextualized and is ready to be analyzed, there will still be many communications 
between randomistas and the Field Team to explain non-intuitive results and signs of control group contamination 
before researchers agree on a final analysis. Even if individuals in the Field Team are the ones with the lower cre-
dentials in the academic side of the RCT network, they have a lot of discretionary power to explain what happened 
in the field for the authors of the final papers.
Hopefully at this point it is clear that the process of implementing development RCTs is long and demands 
coordination efforts between actors based in different continents who speak different languages and have 
different cultural practices, in addition to demanding a great deal of financial and material resources. In each of 
the steps that I described, adaptations and pragmatic decisions to deal with shortcomings are made. Moreover, 
considering the long time that RCTs take from their initial formulation until the data from the final survey is 
collected, the experiments have to deal with a lot of discontinuity and turnover from NGOs’ staff, survey firms, 
and even in the Field Team, which contributes to making the chains of transcriptions from the field to univer-
sities even more complex and attempts to control this process even more ardent. Similar to what Rosengarten 
and Savransky (2019) describe about medical RCTs, these adaptations render evidence produced by devel-
opment RCTs incredibly situated and dependent on the specific relational dynamics that characterize their 
implementation.
452  |     DE SOUZA LEÃO
4.3 | Controversies: Controlling the control group and randomizing social benefits
For all the apparatus described above to function, the biggest challenges for both researchers and implementing 
partners are randomization and the quality of “no-treatment” control groups. It is only by solving these two issues 
that randomistas guarantee the scientific status of their work and are thus able to portray an image of their field 
experiments as free from politics or bureaucratic interference—that is, as different from the image of development 
work as inherently corrupt and inefficient, as suggested by some prominent economists (Easterly, 2007). Yet, con-
sidering that they are working with development projects, there is nothing trivial about solving these challenges.
It is no surprise that the creation of a randomly selected “no-treatment” control group with foreign aid bene-
ficiaries is politically and ethically controversial (de Souza Leao & Eyal, 2019). Whenever the development inter-
vention involves the distribution of resources and services, assigning individuals to control groups inevitably raises 
strong resistance from the development community. In fact, randomized assignment can easily be considered 
illegal (Glennerster, 2015), unless the development intervention can be framed as a non-entitlement, or if it can 
be framed as merely a “nudge” meant to overcome behavioral obstacles rather than a form of assistance (Berndt, 
2015). How can bureaucrats, NGO staff, or politicians justify giving financial resources and social services to some 
people but not to others who need just as much? For this reason, randomistas have to show that their random 
assignment was not affected by political or bureaucratic considerations, and thus have to deal with the resulting 
constraints associated with providing benefits solely for one part of the target population (and withholding bene-
fits from others equally in need) in the name of the scientificity of their experiments.
Moreover, in cases when randomization does happen, welfare regulations and political pressures create the 
risk of “substitution bias”—when individuals in the control group have good substitutes for the tested policy—
which could contaminate the quality of experimental and control groups, and hence undermine the trust in the 
RCT findings (de Souza Leao & Eyal, 2019; Heckman, Hohmann, Smith, & Khoo, 2000). This means that the scien-
tific success of the RCT network described above is contingent on randomistas’ ability to show that participants 
in the experiment did not benefit from other social policies that could interfere with the results—something that 
would be impossible in richer countries, but that is feasible in remote areas of developing countries.
The tasks of randomizing social benefits and controlling the control group are made both more manageable 
and more challenging if we consider the normative and regulatory environment that characterizes the current 
international development field (Watkins, Swidler, & Hannan, 2012). First, in response to the widespread percep-
tion that foreign aid was ineffective and corrupt, the 2000s have been characterized as a period of traditional “aid 
fatigue,” and by the entry of a new set of actors, mainly private foundations and NGOs, to the development field 
(Easterly, 2007; Krause, 2014). As mentioned above, the fact that researchers are now working with NGOs, rather 
than local governments as was done before, means that they can minimize the political and ethical problems posed 
by randomization (de Souza Leao & Eyal, 2019).
Second, the privatization of foreign aid has also altered the type of aid that is disbursed and under what con-
ditions, and has created new accountability struggles for these new actors (Krause, 2014). Considering that aid 
typically flows from foreign donors to global NGOs, who are the ones responsible for selecting local partners who 
will then implement projects in small villages where “development” is supposed to happen, many authors have 
pointed to the principal–agent problem that characterizes the current aid chain (Swidler & Watkins, 2009). On the 
one hand, this long funding chain, combined with the fact that NGOs operate in unfamiliar cultural and political 
terrains marked by “the loss of hope in development” (Krause, 2014, p. 42), results in an aid environment charac-
terized by strong attempts at control by donors and by a focus on measuring aid effectiveness. On the other hand, 
there is great suspicion and criticism of whom the new private donors and randomistas are accountable to, turning 
the rhetoric around experimenting on the poor of the Global South into a target of criticism:
Donors increasingly want to see more impact for their money… Some go so far as to insist that develop-
ment interventions should be subjected to the same kind of randomised control trials used in medicine, 
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with “treatment” groups assessed against control groups… But truly random sampling with blinded sub-
jects is almost impossible in human communities without creating scenarios so abstract as to tell us little 
about the real world. And trials are expensive to carry out, and fraught with ethical challenge… People of 
the south deserve better. (Op-ed signed by 15 leading economists in The Guardian1 )
In sum, randomistas deal with two types of controversies to successfully portray development RCTs as scientific 
and free from politics or other ideological struggles that characterize the foreign aid field. On the academic side, re-
searchers have to convincingly show that assignment to treatment and control groups was random, without political 
interference, and that throughout the experimental period the control group was not contaminated. However, the 
same characteristics that make development RCTs scientifically rigorous are the ones that make them so politically 
controversial. This is because, on the policy side, randomistas have to convince other actors of the importance of ran-
domizing the distribution of social benefits and controlling the control group, while dealing with the fear of corruption 
of development projects and with criticisms of the advisability of foreign aid. The latter issue is particularly salient in 
debates about post-colonialism and the role that foreign funders have in developing countries (Li, 2007; Tilley, 2011).
5  | BOUNDARY WORK BET WEEN TESTING AND DOING DE VELOPMENT
To deal with these controversies, randomistas build on the strategic ambiguity of what is on trial to distance them-
selves from the politics of foreign aid, while being close enough to the field to dictate what works in international 
development and for other development actors to find partnering with Poverty Labs attractive. Hence, while 
development RCTs are conceptualized as a means of finding the causal impact of a policy, they are simultaneously 
touted as serving to test economic theories, making it purposively unclear what is being tested—is it a develop-
ment intervention, an economic theory, or both? The excerpt below is typical of the strategic ambiguity adopted 
by randomistas:
Can a RCT tell us not just whether an intervention worked, but also how and why? When designed 
and implemented correctly, RCTs can not only tell us whether an intervention was effective, but also 
answer a number of other policy-relevant questions… However, as with any single study, a RCT is just one 
piece in a larger puzzle. By combining the results of one or more RCTs with economic theory, descriptive 
evidence, and local knowledge, we can gain a richer understanding of an intervention’s impact. (JPAL, 
2017)
Furthermore, randomistas avoid the political debate about development and foreign aid by testing development 
economic theories that are quite simple, such as in the RCT example introduced earlier: “If you give deworming pills 
to school children, they get sick less frequently, and go to school more often” (see also Abdelghafour, 2017). Even 
when randomistas limit themselves to these small, short-term questions, they deem each trial as answering one part of 
broader questions, which can guarantee their contribution to development economic theory. In this way, randomistas 
connect themselves back to the discipline of economics, not to program implementation or the more complicated 
politics of foreign aid (de Souza Leao & Eyal, 2019).
To put it more generally, randomistas resolved the political problem posed by randomization with foreign aid 
beneficiaries by maintaining a productive ambiguity so that RCTs mean different things to different constituencies 
at different times. Not only do field experiments equivocate between exercises in theory-building and solutions 
to policy problems, but as Rayzberg (2019a) shows, randomistas employ multiple devices to frame the RCT as an 
ambiguous object, partly a development intervention and partly a test, in order to overcome political and practical 
obstacles to randomization. If the RCT is an intervention, local inhabitants and NGO staff would be keen to partic-
ipate, but would not consider it legitimate to arbitrarily deny the benefits to some participants in the control group. 
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If the RCT is testing an economic theory, assignment to the control group would be legitimate, but people would be 
much less eager to participate. The various different designs of development RCTs, Rayzberg (2019a) suggests, can 
be understood as framings meant to contain and manage this problem, to entangle intervention and test together 
so as to be able to recruit participants, but then also to disentangle them, so randomization is possible.
As a result, it is common for development RCTs to have a design in which the control group receives some kind 
of treatment—either a reduced version or the status quo. The lesser treatment is a boundary object. The research-
ers consider it the null condition of the theory-building test; the participants consider it an intervention. This is 
also why experimental phase-in design is so popular.2  Phase-in is a temporal framing device (Rayzberg, 2019a). 
During the first-time frame, the control group receives no treatment; but during the second time frame it receives 
the same treatment as the experimental group. So intervention and testing are disentangled in the present, but 
entangled in the future. Phase-in makes the perceived unfairness of being in a control group much more manage-
able, since participants are promised to receive social benefits in the near future.
5.1 | When the boundary work fails
The mechanisms illustrated by Rayzberg (2019a) are important for understanding the boundary work involved 
in making development RCTs successful. Similar to what Gieryn (1983) explained about the continuous need to 
demarcate boundaries between science and varieties of non-sciences in order to establish scientific authority, 
randomistas construct boundaries between their economic research trials and simple program evaluation in order 
to secure their space in the two worlds. This boundary work, however, is ongoing and historically changing, and 
many times randomistas are not able to maintain the productive ambiguity between research and development 
intervention. My analysis found two main reasons why the boundary work typically fails.
The first reason why randomistas are unable to maintain the boundary between research and intervention is 
that policy beneficiaries sometimes discover that they are in control groups and revolt against the experiment. By 
adopting the phase-in design mentioned above, randomistas are usually able to bypass this problem by promising 
that individuals will benefit from the development project in the future, but it is common for participants to con-
front researchers about their status as members of the control group, even if they are promised future gains. As 
I often heard in fieldwork: “Being in the control group rarely goes unnoticed.” For example, in my observations of 
microcredit RCTs in Peru, individuals in the control group complained multiple times to the NGO that surveyors 
asked questions about their financial behavior in order to limit their chances of receiving credit in the future. While 
surveyors were employed by the Poverty Lab, control group individuals conflated their work with the work of the 
microcredit NGO.
In cases similar to this one, participants blurred the boundaries between research and intervention by holding 
randomistas responsible for both their own and the NGO’s actions, while the Field Team continuously insisted on 
their distinctiveness. In this case, the Field Team demarcated the boundaries between their role as researchers 
and the role of the NGO. They were asking questions about the financial behavior of families to learn how “The 
Poor” made financial decisions, not to limit or facilitate access to microcredit. Yet, while the distinction between 
research and intervention was important for the Field Team, for “research participants this difference is often 
arbitrary, irrelevant, or entirely meaningless”, as pointed out by Rayzberg (2019a, p. 389).
Second, and relatedly, there are cases in which high-level policy officials push back against the interests of ran-
domistas. This opposition may be related to the perception that Poverty Labs’ research “draws its motivation from 
academic concerns that overlap imperfectly with the issues that matter to development practitioners” (Ravallion, 
2009, p. 48); or to the specific politics of the programs that randomistas choose to evaluate. When this happens, 
randomistas are rarely able to maintain the productive ambiguity between research and intervention and face 
backlash regarding the political goals of their tests and how connected they are to broader ideological and polit-
ical agendas happening in the foreign aid field. In other words, their field becomes politicized or contaminated, 
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diminishing their ability to claim its scientific status. A recent battle between UK-based Action Aid and randomistas 
can serve to illustrate this type of resistance.
In this RCT, three US-based economists partnered with Liberia’s federal government to test the effectiveness 
of a public-private partnership to introduce what they referred to as “American-style charter schools or the UK’s 
academies to Liberia’s underperforming education system” (Romero, Sandefur, & Sandhotz, 2017). In order to 
implement the RCT, however, randomistas insisted that the Partnership Schools for Liberia (PSL) program be first 
tested as a pilot in order for experimental evidence to be generated. As a reaction, Action Aid released a Request 
for Proposal for qualitative researchers to closely observe the PSL pilot (Edwards, 2017). Action Aid saw many 
problems with this RCT: (a) it involved an unrealistic financial investment in schools that would not be reproduc-
ible at a larger scale; (b) it aimed to weaken public education in favor of specific private partners; and (c) it did not 
answer the right questions:
[We have] concerns about whether it is feasible for the RCT, however rigorous, to isolate the added value 
that arises from the involvement of private providers. How will the government of Liberia or anyone else 
learn anything, other than the already evident truth that if you spend more money per student and have 
smaller class sizes you will get better results? (Archer, 2016)
While defending the pilot, randomistas got entangled in the politics of post-war Liberia, choosing to publicly de-
fend Liberia’s president and minister of education for their commitment to piloting the new educational policy. Similar 
to the Field Team strategy presented above, randomistas insisted on the strong boundaries and differences between 
their research and the politics of the PSL:
We also agree with Action Aid and Education International on more substantive matters… The key differ-
ence is that we do not read these points as criticisms of our study. Rather, many of the points below are 
concerns over the program itself, many of which we share… We would reframe these concerns as hypoth-
eses that we have explicitly designed the randomized evaluation to test. (Romero et al., 2017)
Yet, even with their attempt to separate their experiment from the politics of the pilot, the public backlash has 
been huge, and researchers are now accused of having a hidden agenda of privatization of educational systems around 
Africa. Indeed, Education International—a partner organization of Action Aid—included the PSL pilot in its global cam-
paign to “oppose privatisation and commercialisation of public education” (EI, 2017), making the controversy visible to 
an even wider audience. As aptly put by a World Bank official3 : “The new Liberia school experiment is destined to be a 
Rorschach test of which side of the private education debate you sit on.” Whether this was the intention of research-
ers or not, their scientific neutrality has been put into question by parts of the development community.
By characterizing their critics as doing “advocacy not research,” however, the three authors did not see their 
test as politicized, claiming instead that they were collaborating for an “ongoing debate that [was] increasingly 
disciplined by facts” (Romero et al., 2017). Put differently, when the boundary work failed, randomistas quickly 
reinforced the boundaries between research and intervention, and put on their “scientist hats,” dismissing devel-
opment actors as driven by “conviction” or, as Esther Duflo, has claimed multiple times, as being driven by the 
“three I’s—Ideology, Ignorance, and Inertia” (Duflo, 2017, p. 9).
6  | CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have argued that the key element for understanding the current success of development RCTs is un-
veiling how randomistas both draw and blur the boundaries between development practice and economic research 
in order to implement field experiments. To do so, I presented the massive organizational effort and the diverse 
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set of actors involved in the making of RCTs and the continuous boundary work that randomistas do to differenti-
ate the purposes and merits of testing development projects from doing them, as a way to bypass the problems 
presented by adopting the experimental method with foreign aid beneficiaries in poor countries. In conclusion, I 
address two implications of this research for the study of testing and tests.
First, continuing a tradition in science and technology studies, my research draws attention to the ongoing 
negotiations between the desire to control and the need for cooperation that characterize the implementation of 
field experiments (Henke, 2000; Kohler & Vetter, 2016). To this end, the case of development RCTs demonstrates 
that successful field experimentation depends on the researcher’s ability to productively manage the ambiguity 
of what is being tested. Yet, contrary to many field sciences, in which scientific authority results from an intense 
familiarity with certain places (Gieryn, 2006), in development RCTs, managing this ambiguity means that randomis-
tas distance themselves from the broader history, politics, and particularities of their object of study, purposively 
dissociating developing countries from the broader dynamics of the foreign aid industry. As a consequence, devel-
opment RCTs differ greatly from the “heroic interventions of modernity, based on the narrative of progress” that 
often characterized foreign aid, focusing instead on diffuse, “evidence-based melioristic interventions” that are 
portrayed as behavioral in nature (Berndt, 2015; Rottenburg et al., 2015, p. 10).
Second, my findings connect to debates about the performativity of tests (MacKenzie et al., 2007). One of the 
arguments that I put forward in this paper is that the credibility of RCTs to the scientific community is contingent 
on the belief that field experiments were not influenced by material, ideological, or political interests. Yet, similar 
to other types of tests, my research shows that the attempts to control developing countries make development 
RCTs extremely performative, since their success depends on development projects adapting their operations 
to fit experimental procedures. Indeed, as the dissemination of RCTs takes place, research and policy designs 
increasingly start to look like textbook RCTs. The UK government, for instance, recently published a policy pa-
per—“Test, Learn, Adapt: Developing Public Policy with Randomised Controlled Trials” (Haynes, Service, Goldacre, 
& Torgerson, 2012), suggesting that all government policies be designed with an RCT evaluation in mind.
At a time when testing and global policy standards are diffusing with higher speed than before, my findings are 
also relevant to assess the potentially exclusionary nature of top-down control over acceptable forms of evidence. 
As the case of development RCTs rests clear, the imposition of evidence hierarchies in international development 
and its consequences for the distribution of global aid are based on the premise that development projects can 
and should be modified for testing purposes. As I have demonstrated, however, transforming developing countries 
into appropriate “fields” for experimentation prompts resistance, misunderstandings, and uneven negotiations that 
often exclude the voice and interests of local beneficiary populations. Moving the conversation forward, more 
qualitative research on the views of these actors is needed to envision the possibilities of creating alternative mod-
els of evaluation, as well as more democratic methods of transferring resources to countries from the Global South.
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 2In my sample, in 35% of studies the control group received either the status quo (i.e., the development project) or a 
slightly reduced version of it. In 40% of studies, researchers adopted the phase-in design, in which the control group 
receives the development policy in a later period. In the remaining 25% of studies, the control group did not receive any 
type of treatment. 
 3Matt Collin in Twitter, September 8, 2017. Available at https ://twitt er.com/aidth ought s/statu s/90618 14383 90902784 
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APPENDIX 
Analytical Sample
TA B L E  A 1   Descriptive statistics
Total (n = 63)
Countries 23 different countries
Average size of RCT 8,660 individuals
Median size of RCT 2,156 individuals
Average duration 12 months
RCT topic: Finance 38%
RCT topic: Education 24%
RCT topic: Health 22%
